In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Picking Up the Pieces of a Shattered Culture:Abandoning Sartre for AquinasR. E. HouserI expect to die in my bed, my successor will die in prison, and his successor will die a martyr in the public square. Then his successor will pick up the shards of a ruined society and slowly help rebuild civilization, as the Church has done so often in human history.—Francis Cardinal George (2010)Here I propose to (...) present a feature of the ethics of Thomas Aquinas, his ethical doctrine of virtue, concentrating on the four cardinal virtues—justice, prudence or good practical judgment, courage, and temperance. Plato first selected them as the four premier virtues, but they go back at least to Homer, for whom wily Odysseus exemplified prudence, warlike Achilles courage, old Nestor justice, Penelope and Telemachus, Odysseus' wife and son, temperance. And I offer them as central to living the morally good life required to "rebuild civilization" in an America that so fair and judicious a man as Cardinal George could call a "ruined society." To see the need for Thomas's solution, we must begin with the problem. Now, all societies depend upon the deep and fundamental ideas of the most important thinkers, prophets and sages, saints, and yes, even philosophers. Their ideas "trickle down" to influence regular folk, like you and me, those who whose hard work actually makes a society thrive, or die. And when those fundamental ideas change, the moral principles of those who embrace those ideas change, and consequently their actions change, and as a result the wider society in which they live changes, for better or worse. Such effects can now be felt across America [End Page 135] by all; but most of us are unaware of the primary intellectual agents of these changes, since they operate at the level of fundamental ideas, not politics or business or day-to-day life. And often their originators have died before the ideas reach full cultural force. So, ignorance of history makes it difficult to deal with present problems caused by those ideas.My first conclusion will be that a major cause of the current coarsening of our culture is the group of ideas of the French philosopher Jean Paul Sartre, even though most Americans have never heard of him, and most of those who recognize his name have not read his works carefully enough to see the connection. Why Sartre? In the honors program at my university, I had a bright young lady of Muslim heritage who had gone to a lycée, one of France's elite classical secondary schools. "Did you read the classics?" "Yes." Expecting Montaigne or Pascal, I asked, "Who?" Her answer: "Sartre." So let us begin with the theory and practice of Sartre and his long-time lover Simone Beauvoir, whose book The Second Sex was an intellectual spark for the women's liberation movement. Then we turn to some real-life examples of Sartrean influence on ourselves and American culture. Finally, for the best remedy for non-Christian and Christian alike, I recommend Aquinas's doctrine of virtue, when taken in its full scope.Sartre's Ethics of Absolute FreedomIn 1946, the year I was born, Sartre gave a lecture to a meeting of French librarians, which became his most popular book, Existentialism is a Humanism. There he laid out the core of his thought about God, humans, and their ethical behavior. Here I arrange his main ideas in an order that facilitates comparison with Aquinas, beginning with his view of human ontology and proceeding to its impact on the four cardinal virtues.Human OntologySartre turned his back on the traditional metaphysical view that every creature is an individual substance defined by a nature or essence it has in common with all other things of that type. In his "first principle of existentialism," Sartre skips over other animate things, plants and animals, and compares humans to inanimate objects:Let us consider... a book or a paper-cutter: here is an object made by an artisan whose inspiration came from a concept.... One cannot postulate a man who makes a paper-cutter but does not know what it is... (shrink)

It is argued that a radical relocation of subjectivity began several thousand years ago. A subjectivity experienced in the centric region of the heart, and in the body as a whole, began to be avoided in favor of the eccentric head as a new location of subjectivity. In ancient literature, for example in Homer's epics, the heart and various other bodily organs were described as centers of subjectivity and organs of perception for spiritual experience and communion with others and (...) the world. Mind and body were integrated. Bur also in the early historical record, as in the Old Testament, the heart and body were increasingly described as rebellious and rejected as impure. Head and heart, mind and body, became estranged. The body was judged an unsuitable, impure vessel for spiritual experience. This change in the location of subjectivity presaged the later development of Platonic, Gnostic, Christian, and Cartesian distinctions favoring mind over and against the body. It may also have contributed to some of the characteristic psychological and pathological processes (e.g., psychosomatic illnesses, repression, narcissism) currently attributed to the psychology of the modern Western, and specifically, North American self. (shrink)

A dialectically rather than chronologically ordered survey: it moves first through the outright dualism of Descartes, to the primacy-of-soul position of Plato, and then to the extremes of Feuerbachian materialism and Berkeleyean immaterialism. Then, returning to pre-philosophical foundations in an attempt to recapture the lived phenomenon of body-soul unity that each of the above philosophers acknowledged, but lost in a welter of reductive abstractions, Van Peursen considers the non-dualistic and non-reductivist conceptions of primitive man, Homeric man, and Biblical man. Coming (...) back to the philosophers, this time to those of a more hylomorphic stamp, Van Peursen critically discusses Aristotle, and the corps vécu analyses of Gehlen, Plessner, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty. Finally, Van Peursen treats the variegated positions of Wittgenstein, Hampshire, and Ryle; the former two coming in for guarded endorsement while Ryle is set forth sympathetically, but attacked for his doctrine of the merely indexical "I." In the last chapter, Van Peursen's own phenomenological version of an "I" which is simultaneously embodied and transcendent—the latter owing to its structure as an "oriented" embodiment—is presented in a suggestive but sketchy fashion. The book is valuable as an introduction, and if, in the end, one is prepared to agree with the spirit, if not the letter, of Van Peursen's embodiment theory, then the metaphilosophical lesson he has tried to drum in throughout the book, namely, the danger inherent in philosophers hypostatizing philosophical or scientific abstractions to the detriment of the integral reality which is man, will make this something more than simply a sensitive survey.—E. A R. (shrink)

The form has lately caused controversy. It is traditionally interpreted as poetic for but O. Skutsch has denied that iota could be lost in this way, pointing out that instead it could be a correctly formed future cf. with a root ending in the laryngeal. M. Campbell rejects this, and rightly claims that ApoUonius borrowed the line from the Homeric Hymn to Pythian Apollo 528.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Kenneth R. Seeskin THE COMEDY OF THE GODS IN THE ILIAD "... no animai but man ever laughs." Aristotle, De Partibus Animalium, 673a8-9 No reader of the Iliad can fail to be struck by the great extent to which social relations among the gods resemble those which obtain among men. Zeus, the oldest and strongest of the Olympian deities, rules as an absolute monarchor patriarch. The "council" meetings over (...) which he presides are not unlike those which occur on earth. Like Agamemnon, he must assert his authority from time to time; and, like any mortal king, he must deal with problems relating to jealousy, adultery, dishonesty, and revenge. To the extent that the gods differ from mortal heroes, those differences are similar to the ones which separate mortal heroes and commoners. The gods occupy the highest place on the scale of excellence, beauty, and social status, mortals with divine ancestry occupy the next position, and so on down the line. Although the above picture is accurate in many respects, there is something about it which is bound to leave one cold, for, unlike his mortal heroes, Homer's gods often appear as clowns. One need only recall scenes like Hephaestus' bumbling attempt to wait on the other immortals (1.584 ff.), Hera's seduction of Zeus (14.157 ff.), or the famous theomachy (21.385 ff.) to see that, ironically, humans frequendy are more dignified than the gods they are trying to please. It was scenes like these which caused Longinus, in his essay On the Sublime, to remark that Homer appears to have made his men gods and his gods men (sec. 9). Now any long story is bound to contain comic relief. But for many authors (Shakespeare, for instance), comic relief is supplied by those whose social status is lower than that of the main characters, e.g., grave diggers, nightwatchmen, country bumpkins, or pettythieves. As Aristotle argued in the Poetics (sec. 2 and 5), comedy is an imitation of men worse than the average. In Book 2 of the Iliad, Homer does use Thersites 295 296Philosophy and Literature for comic effect; yet this scene is noteworthy for being the only one in the book which supports Aristotle's contention. In practically every other case, comedy is supplied by characters better than the average: it is supplied by the gods. Moreover, in the few cases where mortal aristocrats are involved in comic situations (e.g., the rambling speeches of Nestor), the teasing tends to be extremely mild. Farce and slapstick are reserved almost exclusively for the inhabitants of Olympus. Plato, for one, was outraged by passages where the gods look ridiculous and wanted them excised from the text. Not surprisingly, there is a tradition of modern scholars who feel a similar sense of outrage. Walter Leaf, for example, maintained that the theomachy is poorly written and thus not the work of Homer.1 Gilbert Murray argued that several of the scenes in question are in bad taste, exemplify the spirit of Milesian skepticism, and, again, are not the work of Homer.2 Wilamowitz constructed an elaborate theory which claimed that these passages are the work of a later rhapsode who probably was associated with Archilochus.3 Finally, George Calhoun, who exposed the flaws of those just mentioned, concluded that such passages show the influence not of a later period of skepticism but of an earlier, less refined period and were composed merely to please Homer's audience.4 Since it is not my purpose to enter the long debate over the authorship and unity of the text, let me state the guiding assumptions of this essay dogmatically. First, the passages in question are not interpolated and serve important artistic functions. Second, for whatever reason Homer decided to include them, their presence raises profound moral and religious questions. From the outset, it is clear that any anthropomorphic conception of the gods will have to fail in one important respect. The gods are immortal, humans are not. Thus even the lowliest human can do something which no god can—risk his life. For all of their quarrels, deceptive schemes, and forays into the thick of the fighting, the gods are... (shrink)

In the best Menippean tradition theDe Consolatione Philosophiaeof Boethius is peppered with quotations from different authors, most notably from the works of Homer. The quotations are generally spoken by Philosophy, and are used to articulate the narrative, e.g. at 1. 4 we find a line fromIliad1. 363 whose application to the f present situation is immediately comprehensible, and would have been appreciated by the average reader. Another similar quotation is that ofIliad12. 176: ⋯ργαλ⋯oν δ⋯ με ταȗτα Өε⋯ν ὣς π⋯ντ' (...) ⋯γoρε⋯ειν at 4. 6. 53. Such uses are very simiar to what one, finds in theApocolocyntosisof Seneca, albeit there used for comic effect. There are also snippets of popular wisdom in the form of an old proverb – though it is one with Menippean associations – and a Pythagorean maxim. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 11, Issue 2, pp 149 - 172 Even among sympathetic readers, there abides a sense that Proclus’ attachment to his authorities at least partially blinds him to Socratic irony. This has serious implications for his conciliation of Homer and Plato in the Sixth Essay of his _Commentary on the Republic_. A significant number of the passages in Plato’s dialogues, which Proclus takes as necessitating their agreement, appear to be examples of Socrates’ ironic mode. If this apparent (...) necessity exists only through a failure to recognize the ironic character of these statements, it would seem to indicate the truth of E.R. Dodds’ famous judgement of Proclus, that he is properly philosophical only insofar as his thought is not subject to the irrationalisms of his pagan piety. The contention of this essay is that Proclus’ project of conciliation is not, in fact, driven by a refusal to recognize Socratic irony, but by his nuanced interpretation of it, an interpretation that is clarified through a consideration of the striking parallels it has with his understanding of poetic symbol. In following this path of inquiry, it will become evident that Proclus’ position on Socratic irony, and the theological conciliation it necessitates, is not an irrational interruption of his otherwise rational system, but an integral feature of its philosophical coherence. (shrink)

Much effort has been invested by scholars in defining the specific character of the Homeric values as against those that obtained at later periods of Greek history. The distinction between the ‘shame-culture’ and the ‘guilt-culture’ introduced by E. R. Dodds, and that between the ‘competitive’ and the ‘cooperative’ values advocated by A. W. H. Adkins, are among the more influential ones. Although Adkins's taxonomy encountered some acute criticism, notably from A. A. Long, it has become generally adopted both in the (...) scholarly literature and in general philosophical discussions of Greek ethics. Objections to Adkins's approach have mainly concentrated on demonstrating that his denial of the cooperative values to Homer is untenable on general grounds and is not supported by Homeric evidence. Characteristically, Adkins's thesis concerning the centrality to Homer's ethics of the so-called ‘competitive values‘ has never received similar attention, probably owing to the fact that this is the point at which his picture of the Homeric society concurs with the influential reconstructions by W Jaeger and M. I. Finley. The present study oftimēandaretē, generally held to be the two competitive values central to the Homeric poems, purports to address this issue. (shrink)

The responses to the questions of why? when?, how?, where?, and in what ways? business ethics should be taught in the BusinessEthics classroom inundate the scholarly literature. Yet, to date, despite some very interesting ideas, with respect to the answers givento the above question, not only has nothing even close to consensus been reached, but this particular area of pedagogy is instagnation—authors still challenge both the very idea of teaching business ethics as well as the practical value of such courses (...) for ourstudents once they graduate to the corporate world.In this paper I will suggest that the reason for this lack of pedagogical progress is that there has been a serious oversight regarding the most important teaching question of all: Who? I will show that the pedagogical issue of whom should be teaching Business Ethics has been largely ignored, skirted or answered incorrectly. I will then boldly argue that the only necessary condition for successful courses inBusiness Ethics is that they be taught by experts in ethics, i.e., Ph.D.s in philosophy. (shrink)

The public expects members of the medical profession to conduct themselves according to the terms of the Hippocratic oath, yet few physicians and virtually no laypersons know what is in that oath. For the oath to reach beyond its symbolic importance, ethical conduct must be learned and practised. There are many texts on the practice of medicine, surgery and all of the related disciplines, yet one is hard pressed to find anything on ethical practice in any of them. Scholarly texts (...) on ethics tend to deal with the landmark issues and dilemmas that have occurred within particular jurisdictions or religions. This book is intended as a student-friendly text that seeks not to turn students into ethics scholars but to provide them with a practical guide to ethical conduct in everyday medical practice. and discussion are provided for each of the following areas: Ethical Practices in Health Care Law and Ethics Rights of Patients and Responsibilities of Health-Care Providers The Rights of Health-Care Professionals The Duty of Care Confidentiality Consent to Treatment Life and Death Research Ethics Ethics in Public Health Practice Ethical Practice in Everyday Health Care is useful, practical and student friendly. The exercises and discussions will stimulate thought about ethical conduct and help students to develop and translate ethical principles into their daily practice as health-care workers. Dr Walrond offers a ready and concise source of information for medical students on ethical issues. The text is simple, comprehensive and factual, addressing issues encountered in everyday medical practices. Case studies provide practical illustrations of complex ethical issues. (shrink)

Much of the legal and social interest in new neuroimaging techniques stems from the belief that they can deliver on the materialist understanding of the relationship between the brain and the mind. This article looks at predictions about the future both of scientific advances and of social reactions to those predictions. It looks at the likely technical limits on neuroscience-based mindreading, then at the likely limits in how the law might use such technologies. It describes three kinds of technical barriers (...) to detailed and useful mindreading: the likely impossibility of making a complete and accurate model of a human brain in light of its incredible complexity, the problems of interpersonal and intrapersonal plasticity, and the problem of trying to read, now, someone's past mental state. The potential changes to the operation of the law, through the use of mindreading as evidence of pain, deception, or bias, among other things, could be extremely important. (shrink)

Roland Teske's new English translation of The Providence of God, part of William of Auvergne's sprawling work, De universo, is a necessary addition to the works of William available in English. William , theologian, philosopher, and Bishop of Paris, was one of the first scholars to attempt to assimilate Aristotelian philosophy into a Christian intellectual and moral framework. His works comprise a seven-part opus called Magisterium divinale et sapientale, translated by Teske as Teaching on God in the mode of wisdom. (...) De universo, or The Universe of Creatures, is part of the first principal part of the Magisterium, and is itself divided into two principal parts on the material and spiritual universe, respectively. The first principal part of. (shrink)

Because corporate social responsibility can be beneficial to both companies and its stakeholders, interest in factors that support CSR performance has grown in recent years. A thorough integration of CSR in core business processes is particularly important for achieving effective long-term CSR practices. Here, we explored the individual CSR-related competencies that support CSR implementation in a corporate context. First, a systematic literature review was performed in which relevant scientific articles were identified and analyzed. Next, 28 CSR directors and managers were (...) interviewed. The literature review complemented with interview data resulted in the following eight distinct CSR-related competencies: Anticipating CSR challenges; Understanding CSR-relevant systems and subsystems; Understanding CSR-relevant standards; CSR management competencies, including Leading CSR programs, Managing CSR programs, and Identifying and realizing CSR-related business opportunities; Realizing CSR-supportive interpersonal processes; Employing CSR-supportive personal characteristics and attitudes; Personal value-driven competencies, including Ethical normative competencies, Balancing personal ethical values and business objectives, and Realizing self-regulated CSR-related behaviors and active involvement; and Reflecting on personal CSR views and experiences. Based on these results, implications for further research on this topic, as well as implications for practitioners, are discussed. (shrink)

The last phase of Greek philosophy has until recently been less intelligently studied than any other, and in our understanding of its development there are still lamentable lacunae. Three errors in particular have in the past prevented a proper appreciation of Plotinus' place in the history of philosophy. The first was the failure to distinguish Neoplatonism from Platonism: this vitiates the work of many early exponents from Ficinus down to Kirchner. The second was the belief that the Neoplatonists, being ‘mystics,’ (...) were necessarily incomprehensible to the plain man or even to the plain philosopher. To have encouraged the persistence of this superstition in the nineteenth century is the least pardonable of Creuzer's many sins. The third was the chronological confusion involved in the ascription to Saint Paul's contemporary of the works of the pretended Dionysius Areopagita, which contain a fully-developed Neoplatonic theology. Though the fraud had been exposed by Scaliger, these writings continued down to the beginning of the nineteenth century to be used as evidence that the ‘Nsoplatonic trinity’ was an inferior imitation of the Christian one. When this false trail was at length abandoned the fashion for orientalizing explanations persisted in another guise: to the earliest historians of Neoplatonism, Simon and Vacherot, the school of Plotinus was ‘the school of Alexandria,’ and its inspiration was mainly Egyptian. Vacherot says of Neoplatonism that it is ‘essentially and radically oriental, having nothing of Greek thought but its language and procedure.’ Few would be found to-day to subscribe to so sweeping a pronouncement; but the existence of an important oriental element in Plotinus' thought is still affirmed by many French and German writers. (shrink)

Proclus' Elements of Theology is a concise summa of the Neoplatonic system in its fully developed form; and for the student of late Greek thought second in importance only to the Enneads of Plotinus. Professor Dodds has provided a critical text based on a personal examination of some forty manuscripts, together with an English translation and a philosophical and linguistic commentary. First published in 1933, this second edition includes an Appendix of Addenda et Corrigenda and is widely regarded and respected (...) as the definitive edition of the text today. (shrink)

The possibility of early diagnosis and intervention is radically changed by the advent of genetic testing. The recent report of the Nuffield Council on Bioethics is timely and helpful. I have suggested, that not only the severity of the disability indicated by genetic information, and the accuracy of the data, ought to govern the approach to the implementation of screening for genetic disorders. In addition, assessment of the value of the information to those involved should be considered. The efficacy of (...) the available therapeutic measures, combined with the prognostic data are important indices of the value of the information. These measures fall into three categories and thus indicate that three different courses of intervention may be appropriate. Three approaches to diagnosis and intervention are then outlined, drawing on the experience of various clinical initiatives. (shrink)

In this study, the drawbacks of using some religious concepts produced in the tradition of Western thought directly in their studies on Islamic belief will be discussed. The claim in question will be put forward within the framework of the concepts of deism, atheism and especially theism. Especially by reviewing the philosophy of religion studies made in Turkey, the fact that the three concepts mentioned are directly transferred to the philosophy of religion studies carried out in the Islamic world will (...) be revealed as a problem and this situation will be defined as the reduction of Islamic belief to some other concepts. The aim to be achieved by emphasizing such a problem is to ensure that the principles of Islamic belief are understood in their own meaning without reducing them to other meanings. Because every concept produced within the tradition of Western thought is directly related to its own intellectual and practical past. For this reason, when a solution or criticism that is formed in a different sense or dependent on a certain practical past is brought to Islamic thought, the philosophical and practical past of those concepts will also be carried. However, every belief should be evaluated by considering its own meaning and history. Evaluating this problem through concepts that Islam directly rejects, such as deism and atheism, is more understandable than the concept of theism. However, when it comes to the concept of theism, the subject becomes quite complex. Because in almost all sources, Islam is defined as a theistic religion and this is considered as a necessary pre-acceptance for the Islamic belief. However, theism is the understanding of God in modern Western thought, in which Descartes rationalism and Newtonian mechanics are accepted as the dominant element. Such an understanding of God, built within the epistemic boundaries of the thinking subject, is incompatible with the Islamic conception of God. (shrink)